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Objectives: This article aims to elaborate chronotope disruption —a changed relation to time and space—
as a sensitizing concept for understanding chronic illness narratives. Methods: Sixteen men and 16
women with Type 2 diabetes were purposefully sampled. Each was interviewed about his or her
experience of diabetes self-management using the biographical-narrative interview method. Transcripts
were inspected for key moments defined as emotionally laden stories relevant to the purpose of the
research. We present dialogically inflected discursive analysis of exemplar extracts. Results: The
analysis demonstrates how the concept of chronotope disruption helps identify, and understand, impor-
tant aspects of patients’ chronic illness narratives. First, we investigate how medical advice can conflict
with embodied experience and how progressive bodily deterioration can provoke a reevaluation of past
illness (self-mis)management. Second, the increasing temporal and spatial intrusion of chronic illness
into participants’ lives is examined. Finally, we focus on the masquerade of health as an attempt to
manage, hide, or deny that one is physically challenged. Conclusions: Chronotope disruption offers a
useful sensitizing concept for approaching chronic illness narratives and around which to organize
analytical insights and to develop practice. Chronotope analysis fills an important gap in the science
through compensating current health sciences’ focus on rationality, cognition, and prospective time
(prediction) with a patient-oriented focus on emotionality, embodiment, and retrospective time (nostal-
gia). Chronotope disruption could be used to develop practice by gaining empathic understanding of
patients’ life-worlds and provides a tool to examine how new technologies change the way in which the
chronically ill have “being” in the world.
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In this article, we elaborate a little-investigated aspect of chronic
illness narratives: the grounding of biographical disturbance in
time and space. Following the work of Bakhtin (1981, 1984), we
identify this phenomenon as “chronotope disruption.” Chronotope
refers to the way in which recognizable patterns of interwoven
time and space are expressed in literature through genre forms
(e.g., the way in which classic epic is set in the deep past, in
dramatic locations, and stresses hierarchical social structure). Ac-
cording to Bakhtin, genres portray particular ideologies, in large
part, through their representation of time and space (e.g., the heroic
vision of epic). Thus, chronotope refers not merely to the formal
features of a given narrative; of greater interest is the way in which
chronotope defines a field of possibilities available to the narrator
(Morson, 1994). Ideology includes assumptions about what counts
as knowledge and our exploration of chronotope disruption will be
illuminated by Bakhtin’s (1993) articulation of two key contrasting
epistemologies: istina (abstract knowledge) and pravda (lived
truth that is embodied and invested in emotionally). Chronotope
helps structure the stories we tell about our everyday lives
(Bakhtin, 1981), including, as we will show, narratives of becom-
ing and being chronically ill.
Bakhtinian concepts have only recently been taken up in qualitative
methods in psychology (e.g., Sullivan, 2012) and applied in health-
related fields (e.g., Gomersall, Madill, & Summers, 2012; Madill &
Sullivan, 2010) and have massive untapped potential. We argue here
that chronotope disruption offers a particularly useful sensitizing
concept (Glaser, 1996), or theoretically informed starting point, for
approaching chronic illness narratives and around which to organize
analytical insights and to develop practice. The kind, or pattern, of
chronotope disruption communicated by patients will depend, at least
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in part, on the nature of their conditions and the way in which these
are experienced and interpreted. In this respect, chronotope analysis
bears some resemblance to the self-regulation model of illness, which
emphasizes the role of visceral experience and personal interpreta-
tions of illness in guiding health-related action (e.g., Baumeister &
Vohs, 2007; Leventhal, Brissette, & Leventhal, 2003). However,
chronotope analysis goes further by exploring the ways in which
making sense of “being ill” unfolds in the changing relationship
between body, time, and space. For example, in terms of time, curable
acute illness may lend itself to narratives structured by restorative
time (regaining health), disabilities incurred through accidents by
ruptured time (then–now), and chronic illnesses that are relapse-
remitting to cyclical time (better–worse–better–worse).
In our elaboration of chronotope disruption in chronic illness,
we focus on Type 2 diabetes as a chronic illness that tends to have
increasingly negative impacts on health as time passes unless it is
carefully managed. Here, as we will see, the course of the disease
can be expressed in narratives structured by provisional time and,
ultimately, by the revelation of fading time: both forms character-
ized by the closing-in of time, in terms of both scope (where time
should be focused) and duration (how much time is left). In this
respect, we show that chronotope poses some interesting answers
to psychological questions around the agency and mutability of the
self (see also Morson, 1994, pp. 86–88).
Narrative analysis has a long and sometimes vexed relationship
with scientific psychology, stretching back to Freud’s case studies
and Wundt’s Volkerpsychologie (Murray, 1997). However, use of
the narrative form as material for psychological understanding has
enjoyed a resurgence of interest in recent decades, particularly
since Sarbin’s (1986) influential work proposing narrative as an
alternative root metaphor for psychology. The intensity of narra-
tive research requires relatively small samples and has often made
use of the case study, or case study series, and Riessman (2003)
notes that scientific disciplines tend to have an ambivalent rela-
tionship to this methodology. Narrative case studies are sometimes
dismissed as anecdotal evidence, yet case studies are drawn on in
teaching to convey technical knowledge through detailed examples
and are increasingly recognized as an essential aspect of practice
within health-related professions in order to facilitate appreciation
of the lived experience of health and illness (Bell, 1999; Hydén,
1997; Mishler, 1984; Verghese, 2001). As Greenhalgh (2012)
argues, while “hard” scientific knowledge is indispensable for the
practice of medicine, so too is the clinician’s capacity for empathic
understanding: “those who cannot feel will not see” (p. 95).
Furthermore, when examined in detail, the majority of clinical
cases fit the probabilistic and abstract discourse of evidence-based
medicine quite poorly. Similarly, in terms of understanding health
behavior, formal models can only go so far. The psychologist’s
imagination and empathic understanding should also be enriched
by attending to patients’ particular, concrete, day-to-day reality—
the basis of the illness narrative form.
Narratives are important for understanding how people convey
the changing relationship between body, time, and space brought
about through illness (Radley, 1999). Narrative creates what Frank
(1997) calls a “potential consciousness of illness” that makes
suffering legible and relevant to both story teller and audience and
is a means to engage with, and potentially reformulate, difficult
experiences. Perhaps more familiar to health psychologists, Carr
(1986) makes much of the link between temporality and meaning-
making. Drawing on Husserl, he asks how we could lead mean-
ingful lives if we experienced time as a series of isolated events.
By relating a narrative we link up time to make coherent meaning
out of the flux of experience (Murray, 2000; Ricoeur, 1984), a
moment taking on its wholeness in relation to what preceded it and
anticipated implications for the future.
The need to create coherence may, itself, be indicative of the
disruption arising with the onset of illness. Bury (1982) developed an
influential account of chronic illness experiences as forms of “bio-
graphical disruption,” in which the onset of illness is understood as
“[a] kind of experience where the structures of everyday life and the
forms of knowledge which underpin them are disrupted” (p. 169). For
Bury, there are three dimensions to biographic disruption: the disrup-
tion of taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviors, the disruption to
explanatory systems that necessitate a reevaluation of the self, and the
mobilization of resources in response to the disruption. The biograph-
ical disruption model has generated a wealth of debate, discussion,
and empirical research; has weathered postmodern and disability-
movement critiques; and has provided a powerful argument for a
focus on subjective embodiment in the social scientific study of illness
(for a review, see Williams, 2000). Although scholars with an interest
in biographical disruption do mobilize temporality and space in their
analyses, this has typically been implicit and consequently underde-
veloped. For example, Bury (1982) describes the loss for women with
early onset rheumatoid arthritis as a shift “from a perceived normal
trajectory through relatively predictable chronological steps, to one
fundamentally abnormal and inwardly damaging” (p. 171). Here,
benchmarks define where a body should be at certain temporal points
in a life story, but Bury’s emphasis is the disruption to biography
rather than the grounding of biographical disturbance in time and
space that we are elaborating here as chronotope disruption.
More specifically, little empirical research has focused on tem-
poral and spatial features in experiences of diabetes. Exceptions
are Mol (2000), who investigated, from a Foucaultian perspective,
the impact of Type I and 2 diabetic management devices on the
experience of time; Lawton, Peel, Parry, and Douglas (2008), who
investigated change in accounts of Type 2 diabetes causation over
time; and Balcou-Debussche and Debussche (2009), who explored
the facilitating aspects of hospital space-time on Type 2 diabetes
self-management. Building on these studies of diabetes, we argue
that sensitivity to the chronotope disruptions of chronic illness
provides a theoretically informed starting point around which to
organize analytical insights and to develop practice.
In summary, our purpose is to elaborate chronotope disruption
as a sensitizing concept for understanding chronic illness narra-
tives. Our example analysis is of the illness narratives of people
diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes.
Method
Ethics
Ethical approval was granted by the Leeds Central Research
Ethics Committee for research conducted in the National Health
Service. Informed signed consent was obtained from all partici-
pants to take part in the study, to audio-record interviews, and to
use anonymized quotes in reports. Participant pseudonyms are
used throughout.
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Participants
Participants were recruited from two diabetes centers in a large
city in the North of England. Sixteen men and 16 women took part,
purposefully sampled within gender for equal numbers of poor and
good glycemic control, as indicated by consistency of previous
three recorded medical markers (HbA1c 7 and 10, respec-
tively). We explore and compare the narratives provided by par-
ticipants fitting these “good” and “poor” control profiles elsewhere
(Gomersall, Madill, & Summers, 2012). Mean age was 65 years
(range 45–81 years), and participants had been diagnosed with
Type 2 diabetes for a mean of 14 years (range 2–30 years).
Data Generation
Participants were each interviewed by the first author at home
using an adapted version of the biographical-narrative interview
method (Wengraf, 2001, 2009). This involved asking an initial
question for inducing narrative: “Can you please tell me the story
of your life since your first encounter with Type 2 diabetes, all the
events and experiences that were important for you, personally, up
to now? Please take as much time as you want.” The interviewer
listened carefully and took notes that formed the basis of the
second part of the interview in which participants were ask to
elaborate on events, following the sequence in which the events
had been related by the participant. Interviews lasted for a mean of
68 min (range 36–134 min) and were transcribed verbatim using
the following conventions: . . .  extract started or ended mid
turn; [. . .] text omitted midturn; (.) very short, untimed pause;
(2)  pause timed in seconds; ((laughs))  description of addi-
tional communication information; [racing course]  names omit-
ted for anonymity; word underlined  particular stress on that
word; dash at the end of a word  a cut-off and change of
direction midturn.
Analytical Assumptions
Dialogical analysis is sometimes grouped with other discursive
and sociolinguistic methods that have been utilized in academic
psychology in recent decades, including critical discourse analysis
(Fairclough, 2011) and discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter,
1992). Like these approaches, dialogical analysis is skeptical with
regard to the existence of enduring, internal psychological struc-
tures that pre-exist language (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, intentions).
Instead, language itself is seen as constituting the psyche, which is,
hence, observable through the deployment of linguist resources.
However, whereas discourse analysis adopts a “blank” view of
subjectivity (i.e., the author or speaker theorized as a text: Parker,
1994) or implies a strategic user of language (Madill & Doherty,
1994), Bakhtin assumes a “needy” subject, sensually engaging
with the world and with others in a search for meaning (Sullivan,
2012). Hence, in terms of epistemology, dialogical analysis priv-
ileges pravda (lived truth that is embodied and invested in emo-
tionally) over istina (abstract knowledge) and so rejects social
constructionism in its strong form (Shotter, 1993).
Analytical Procedures
Transcripts were inspected for key moments defined as emo-
tionally laden stories relevant to this original purpose which had a
recognizable beginning and end. Hence, key moments can be
viewed as distinct episodes within the overall narrative structure of
the interview (see Madill & Sullivan, 2010). In total, 186 key
moments were identified, ranging between a quarter page to just
over two pages of A4 in length, with participants contributing
between two and 12 key moments each. Key moments were
initially analyzed in terms of the following categories that opera-
tionalize central features of Bakhtin’s (1981, 1984) theory of
chronotope: genre(s), emotional register, time–space elaboration,
context. Notes pertaining to these four categories were written up
into a table for each participant. While a variety of chronotopes
were identified in the data (e.g., cyclical time, medical and lay
timespaces), chronotope disruption was identified as an important
phenomenon in that all participants described, in relation to their
diabetes, increasing challenges in their embodied relationship
with, or being in, time and space. Detailed familiarity with relevant
key moments allowed us to identify three main patterns of chro-
notope disruption. We named each pattern in way that captured its
central meaning. In the following section we provide an analysis of
each identified pattern of chronotope disruption through close
discursive analysis of exemplar extracts paying particular attention
to time-space elaboration and emotional register (see Sullivan,
2012).
Analysis
The analysis is presented in three sections, each demonstrating
how the concept of chronotope disruption helps identify, and find
a way into understanding, important aspects of patients’ chronic
illness narratives, our example being Type 2 diabetes: (a) medi-
calized and embodied disruptions, (b) tyranny of the (body) clock,
and (c) performing normativity.
Medicalized and Embodied Disruptions
The concept of chronotope disruption fundamentally suggests a
shift in one’s embodied ways of being in the world. However, in
the early phases of a chronic illness, people may be asymptomatic
and have to trust medical experts’ assurances that management is
necessary.
Extract 1
Brian: . . . Hand on heart I have never ever experienced
anything faintly associated with diabetes until the
surgeon or the nurse said, “There’s glucose in your
urine. We’ll do a blood test. You could well be a
diabetic.” And I’d not had a great thirst. I had not
been tired. I had not been bad tempered. I’d not lost
weight or put weight on. I’d stayed fairly stable.
Nothing would have told me . . .
Brian lists the kinds of disruptions he might have expected with
diabetes but had not experienced in its early stages: “a great thirst
(. . .) tired (. . .) bad tempered (. . .) lost weight or put weight on.”
He construes such signs and symptoms as being the body’s way of
speaking, of communicating problems, but that his own body had
been mute: “Nothing would have told me.” In fact, it is medical
personnel, the “surgeon or the nurse,” who informed him of his
illness through the results of a test, “said, ‘There’s glucose in your
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urine.”” And paradoxically he invokes the bodily idiom “hand on
heart” to underscore how he had no prior knowledge of his illness
when the reason had been his body’s very silence on the matter.
Here the imperative for (self-)management arises from the abstract
and scientific standpoint of the health professional, and Brian is
asked to look beyond his own embodied experience.
Adrian, too, is requested to reconsider his accumulated embod-
ied experience in favor of medical knowledge, but in the opposite
direction to that of Brian.
Extract 2
Adrian: I had a disagreement with Dr. X.
Interviewer: Oh right yeah.
Adrian: He said, “We want you down to about five,”
and I said, “No way.” I said, “No way.” I said,
“I start to hypo at six.” I said, “There’s no way
you’re going to get me down to five.” He said,
“Well that’s what we would like.” I said, “What
you’re doing is you’re using it as a benchmark.
You can’t do that because it affects different
people different ways.” I said, “There’s no way
we’re going to get me down to five.” So he
said, “Well what are you happy with?” I said,
“Between eight and fifteen I feel fine. Blood
taken was about twelve point seven this morn-
ing. I’m quite happy at that. No side effects.
I’m not sweating. No shakes. I’m quite happy
at that” . . .
Whereas Brian had experienced no signs or symptoms, Adrian
experienced his body as more vulnerable than the medical view-
point would suggest: “No way [. . .] I start to hypo at six.” He also
makes a case that the body is more unique and idiosyncratic than
allowed for in medical knowledge arguing that the doctor is “using
it [normative blood glucose values] as a benchmark. You can’t do
that because it affects different people different ways.” Of partic-
ular interest is the way in which Adrian evokes blood glucose level
as a specific kind of illness chronotope that provides the coordi-
nates of his wellbeing over time: “between eight and 15 I feel
fine.” Hence Adrian’s “disagreement with Dr. X” is an attempt to
avoid, what would be to him, the chronotope disruption of “going
down to about five” and likelihood of entering the traumatic
timespace of a “hypo.” The felt body, here, is disrupted in an
obvious or “noisy” fashion—“sweating [. . .] shakes”—in stark
contrast to the disembodied and abstract “benchmark” constructed
for him in medical space. Consequently, the experienced disrup-
tion of the hypo takes precedence over longer-term blood glucose
control as advised by the doctor.
In this extract, Adrian describes a discrete past event but communicates
it in reported direct speech inviting the felt immediacy of the original
interaction: “He said [. . .] I said [. . .] I said [. . .] I said [. . .] He said [. . .] I
said [. . .] I said [. . .] So he said [. . .] I said.” This has the effect of
presenting his perspective as a still current truth. In this way,
Adrian’s account fuses past with present, the form of his narrative
cohering with his attempt to maintain the chronotope stability of
his embodied experience within the context of tensions with med-
ical advice.
For others, avoiding chronotope disruption was, in contrast,
premised on a nostalgic maintenance of their prediabetes orienta-
tion to time and space. In the absence of immediately felt threat to
health, several participants reported rejecting (self-)management at
the asymptomatic stage. Brian, for example (Extract 1), went on to
explain how he “stupidly paid it no respect whatsoever” until, after
a number of serious complications, he received the strongly
worded warning from his doctor that “you haven’t got a long time
to live if you keep going like this.” A similar ultimatum is implied
in the following extract from Rachel. Here we demonstrate how
sensitivity to the ways in which chronotope disruption is woven
into patients’ narratives can provide insight into important shifts in
subjectivity and stance toward illness (self-)management.
Extract 3
Rachel: I’ve learnt I don’t have to say yes to everybody.
Because I was “yes yes” I would agree with- you
could tell me I was black and I would have said
“Yeah I’m black.” I’d agree with them. And then it
was like over the years and then finally after this
time and I realised no you don’t have to. So the
rebellion started in and then- no I don’t think rebel-
lion is the word. I think I’ve found my voice. So
you’re telling me, “Rachel you’ve got diabetes. Now
you’ve got to learn to control this sugar. You need to
cut down. You need to cut these things out.” And I
think, “Who are you to tell me what to do?” [. . .]
What you need is the experience and to learn how to
control to see what I got away without experiencing
exactly what it can do to my body. And now over
these last few years I’m seeing what it can do to me
and pray to God I haven’t left it too late.
At the beginning of this extract, Rachel articulates a move away
from a previous acquiescent, passive position through an extreme
case formulation suggesting that she would have accepted even
such blatant falsehoods as being told she was “black.” It is only
with the passing of time, “over the years and then finally after this
time,” that she “finds her voice.” Thus, in a similar way to Adrian
(Extract 2), the voice emanating from medical space—“Now
you’ve got to learn to control this sugar. You need to cut down.
You need to cut these things out”—is rejected as an unwarranted
imposition into her personal space. However, this intonation of
defiance—of questioning the right of healthcare professionals to
“tell [her] what to do”—is also rendered problematic from her
current perspective: “over these last few years I’m seeing what it
can do to me and pray to God I haven’t left it too late.” This
indexes a transformed subjectivity: contrite, frightened, and seek-
ing redemption, which, in turn, shows how chronotopes can build
up and overlay one another in the course of a narrative (see also
Holquist, 1990, pp. 116–121).
The anguish of potentially being “too late” suggests revelation
of being on the edge between provisional time (in which there is
still hope that one can make provision) and fading time (in which
there is only a limited viable future for the self). Indeed, for many
participants, felt changes in the body were a prerequisite for
engaging with (self-)management and the warnings of medical
professionals, friends, and family acquired a retrospective, nostal-
gic prescience as diabetic complications emerged. And we can see
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in Rachel’s narrative a wider arc of teleological time in that the
meaning of past events becomes evident only from her standpoint
in the present and, as in all these disparate examples, the invitation
is to disavow the past.
Notably, each of the above extracts (1–3) relates specifically to
medical space, and it seems the contrast between embodiment and
medical knowledge could often create disagreements between our
participants and medical professionals. However, as we go on to
explore below, being ill in different spaces could be associated
with some quite different subjective implications.
Tyranny of the (Body) Clock
As it worsens, chronic illness can make increasing temporal and
spatial intrusions into life. In particular, our participants described
how managing diabetes could diminish their capacity to improvise
in time. They had to monitor and restrict what they were ingesting,
and when, and this vigilance could severely dent their sense of
acting freely or spontaneously. Jacob explained:
Extract 4
Jacob: Um I suppose really er (2) the um (.) particularly
er my son lives in Australia [. . .] I’ve been over
there a few times y’know [. . .] and of course it’s
hot over there ((laughs)) [. . .] so it it’d be very
nice to be able to just er y’know drop into er a
bar somewhere y’know a club or something like
that (.) and get a couple of pints y’know.
Interviewer: Mm mm.
Jacob: And it’s so easy to just sit down and say, y’know
I’ll have a sandwich. I’ll have a packet of crisps.
Something like that y’know [. . .] um I’m think-
ing have I done that (.) take more insulin
((laughs)) have I y’know. So it’s not entirely (1)
out o’ way to do that y’know but you can’t do it
without thinking . . .
Jacob states that “it’d be very nice to be able to just er y’know
drop into er a bar somewhere y’know a club or something like that
(.) and get a couple of pints.” In doing so, he construes this desire
to be unremarkable: “to just,” and to consist of casual actions:
“drop into. . .a bar somewhere. . .get a couple of pints.” And he
repeats this structure, emphasizing the normality of his wish and
the ease with which it usually associated: “so easy to just sit down
and say y’know I’ll have a sandwich. I’ll have a packet of crisps.”
These ordinary pleasures are not completely denied him. They are
not “not entirely (1) out o’ way.” But the spontaneity has gone and
it has become effortful in that Jacob now has to prepare himself,
“take more insulin,” and “can’t do it without thinking.” Similarly
to the extracts in our previous section of analysis, there is interplay
here between Jacob’s desire to enjoy ordinary activities and the
requirements of diabetes self-management. However, unlike the
previous extracts, he does not attribute the imperative for self-
management as emanating from an external, clinical space. Rather,
he has incorporated it as part of his own “thinking.”
Our participants described the intrusiveness of the illness in-
creasing as the diabetes progressed, especially in terms of demands
on their time. This phenomenon was described evocatively by
Lauren. She had been diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes for 12 years
and deteriorating glycemic control had led to an intensive regime
comprising insulin and tablets.
Extract 5
Lauren: . . . I’m constantly taking medication and I just felt
so fed up and there came a stage where I just- I didn’t
want to get out of bed. I didn’t want to take my
medication. I mean at one point I used to keep my
tablets in a little box you know in open view. Now
they’re in the kitchen in a drawer that is shut because
I don’t want to look at them . . .
Lauren’s description of herself as “constantly taking medica-
tion” indicates the felt temporal pervasiveness of treatment. In fact,
her narrative is full of temporal signifiers: “there came a stage,” “at
one point,” “I used to,” and “now.” These present the progression
through which medicines have taken over Lauren’s existence, and
the overwhelming unpleasantness of this is conveyed by her at-
tempted stasis of not wanting “to get out of bed.” To avoid the
potentially fatal consequences of acting on the feeling that she
“didn’t want to take (her) medication,” Lauren has had to distance
herself from them. She used to keep her tablets “in open view” but
now puts them “in the kitchen in a drawer that is shut because I
don’t want to look at them.” Hence, despite the relatively small
amount of literal space taken up by tablets that can be kept in “a
little box,” Lauren feels that they are in danger of taking over her
subjective world with the lines between personal and medical
space blurring.
Living with chronic illness, then, can diminish the capacity to
improvise in time, can pervade the experience of “being in time,”
and dominate one’s personal space, leading some patients to de-
velop strategies for reducing or coping with these chronotope
disruptions. This may be especially pronounced in an illness such
as diabetes that requires regular, vigilant monitoring and often
profound changes in hitherto taken-for-granted practices. Partici-
pants, such as Jacob, offset preparation against the normalization
and pleasure of eating “treat” foods or indulging at special occa-
sions and others, such as Lauren, used creative approaches such as
hiding medications from view. Others took a more fatalistic stance,
adapting as best they could when the need arose and, perhaps
paradoxically, in so doing, rescuing some sense of spontaneity.
These orientations to the challenges of worsening chronic illness
are not mutually exclusive and Thomas’s story incorporated a
complex mix of adaptation, resistance, and fatalism: provisional
time and fading time.
Extract 6
Interviewer: Yeah (9) now you say um you say you’ve arrived
at your present state that you’re happily checking
your blood sugar every couple of days and er
injecting your insulin and so forth. Um can you
tell me about this phase? The present state?
Thomas: Um I’m OK. It hasn’t stopped me doing any-
thing I want to do.
Interviewer: Mm.
Thomas: I can still go to cricket matches. I can still go
drive my motor car around. Go to [racing course]
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to the hill climb. Really the um the urgency has
gone out of life because if I don’t do something
today I can do it tomorrow which is nice. I enjoy
that. Um (.) there is of course the inevitable um
decline towards desperation and death um which
I try not to think about. It’s gonna happen sooner
or later (1) but then it’s going to happen to
everybody isn’t it?
Interviewer: Of course yeah.
Thomas: Not just me fortunately. So you do um (1) worry
about the future at times. It it’s completely out of
control as far as I’m concerned. I can’t see that I
can do anything about it . . .
This extract commences with the interviewer glossing Thomas’s
narrative so far as indicating positive adaptation to a relatively
intensive medical regime: “you’re happily checking your blood
sugar every couple of days and er injecting your insulin.” The
disruptive potential of this regime, but also Thomas’s success
resisting this disruption, is indicated in his response that “(i)t
hasn’t stopped me doing anything I want to do.” The importance
of adaptation as a strategy of resistance to the encroachment of
illness is stressed by Thomas through repetition in a three-part list
of what it is that he can do: “go to cricket matches [. . .] go drive
my motor car [. . .] go to [racing course]”. And that he can “still”
do these things indicates a nostalgic desire to preserve these
pleasures against the threat that they will be lost as time passes.
However, there are limits to his personal agency. Luckily, as a
retired person, “if I don’t do something today I can do it tomor-
row.” But this suggests accepting and working round disrupted
plans, or making always provisional plans, due to his illness. In
more radically deterministic terms, the temporal association in the
narrative to an unavoidable finality—“there is of course the inev-
itable um decline toward desperation and death”—suggests a fore-
shadowed time (Morson, 1994) in which the possibilities of the
present are held hostage, limited in their meaning by a predestined
future.
Hence, in Thomas’s extract there is an exploration of where he
can, and cannot, muster control over the impact of his progressing
disease—or to put it the language of chronotope, to what extent he
can view timespace as open or closed. Importantly, this is infused
with contrasting affective valance. Thomas does not challenge the
interviewer’s description of him as “happily checking your blood
sugar.” In his own words he is “OK” and he implies a pleasant
serenity in his current circumstances in which he has agency, even
if it is constricted to choosing not to act: “if I don’t do something
today I can do it tomorrow which is nice.” On the other hand, the
future, construed as out of his control, is saturated with distressing
emotions, which suggests continued resistance within his apparent
fatalism: “inevitable um decline toward desperation and death um
which I try not to think about” and “worry about the future at
times. It it’s completely out of control.” Thomas is making the best
of provisional time, grasping a sense of agency and maintaining
pleasant activities where he can. However, time is closing in, the
(body) clock is still ticking, and its tyranny infuses Thomas’s
account.
Performing Normativity
It is recognized by scholars (e.g., Swain & French, 2008) that
many of the problems encountered by disabled people arise not
strictly from the body but from an environment that assumes
able-bodiedness—and that thus constitutes a space often difficult
to negotiate when one does not conform. One participant, Caroline,
gave an evocative example of such a disruption. Along with Type
2 diabetes, she had experienced a lupus infection in her lungs,
which additionally compromised her mobility. In the following
extract, she describes an inventive strategy to perform normativity
in spite of the limitations of her body.
Extract 7
Caroline: . . . but gradually I find when I finished working at
the end of the day- I used to find at the end of the
day where I’d parked the car in the car park. It took
me ages to get there because I was so breathless. So
what I used to do is buy an evening paper. Pretend
I’m reading it and puff a little bit till I get to the car.
And then it got worse and worse and I thought,
“Something’s not right here.”
Caroline’s account could be viewed as a chronotope metamor-
phosis because the changes she noticed were incremental, appear-
ing “gradually” and getting “worse and worse,” and eventually
having a significant impact on mundane activities such as walking
to her car: “took me ages to get there because I was so breathless.”
She then goes on to describe how she managed this disruption: she
used to “buy an evening paper pretend I’m reading it and puff a
little bit till I get to the car.” Interestingly, what she attempts to
mitigate is the potential negative evaluation of her breathlessness
by strangers in the car park—thus enacting a protection of “face”
(Goffman, 1955) via a manipulation of time and space. Although
she does not fulfil the ideal of the healthful body, she can perform
this body—masquerade as healthy—in the act of “pretend(ing)”
that her slow movement is due to reading the paper. However,
maintaining this façade of normality is increasingly effortful and,
as her puffing gets “worse and worse,” she comes to the realization
that “something’s not right here.” This raises the possibility that
manipulating her social presentation, that is, attempt to hide the
chronotope disruption of being physically challenged through
chronic illness in the presence of others, is pending also her own
engagement with her physical problems.
As Caroline’s anecdote suggests, adjusting to degeneration in
bodily functionality was often most difficult in terms of one’s
ways of being with others. This also became complex for some of
our male participants who struggled to find new ways of doing
gender in the context of a chronic illness that limited their capacity
to inhabit traditionally masculine timespace. Brian, for example,
spoke about a profound affective change that had set in following
a heart attack.
Extract 8
Brian: I can watch the television and summat and I start
crying. There’s tears rolling down me face.
That’s happened for last ten years but it’s grad-
ually got worse y’know. Somebody that knows
me they says, “He couldn’t have a heart attack
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’cause he didn’t have a heart.” And I were
known as destroyer when I played rugby
y’know. Nobody were too big. Nobody were too
tall and I never (.) all I used to think about were
winning and I I never had no no qualms wi’ what
I had to do. I I were a destroyer and they had a
destroyer. Every team had a destroyer. Every-
body had an enforcer [. . .]
Interviewer: Mm mm (5) that sounds like quite a big change
in your in your experience there.
Brian: Well it is ’cause it can happen when you’re out
as well [. . .] y’know. And if it just happened
when I’m at home I wouldn’t take no mind but it
can happen when I’m out.
Like Caroline’s walk to her car, Brian describes bodily changes
that “gradually got worse” in relation to a mundane, everyday
space, this time watching “the TV.” However, unlike Caroline’s
breathlessness, the change that Brian describes is emotional, gen-
dered, and counterhegemonic: he is a man who can “start crying”
while watching TV. This appears to be a longstanding change in
that is has “happened for last 10 years” and is one that is presented
as a complete contrast to a former hypermasculine identity.
He has been a rugby player “known as destroyer” due to his
physical prowess, and his masculinity was enacted through being
competitive and ruthless: “all I used to think about were winning and
I I never had no no qualms wi’ what I had to do.” Thus, chronotope
is disrupted in that Brian can no longer move through the time and
space of the rugby pitch in ways that enact a “destroyer” identity. On
the contrary, he encapsulates the shock associated with his new
affective vulnerability in the evocative statement that “he couldn’t
have a heart attack ‘cause he didn’t have a heart,” although credits this
poetics to “somebody that knows me.” However, he de-emotionalizes
his crying so that, although “there’s tears rolling down me face,” no
affective trigger is specified. The tears just “start”; it can just “happen”
when he is out, and “just happened when I’m at home.” Importantly,
though, whereas in private his tears are of little consequence: “I
wouldn’t take no mind,” making the contrast with crying that “can
happen when I’m out,” implies that this change does bother him in
social space.
Men were more likely to lament how chronic illness had forced
them out of work, or to adapt through taking up different work,
underlining how chronotope generally, and chronotope disruption
specifically, can be a gendered phenomenon. Adam, for example,
explained that he had to give up the manual side of plumbing to focus
on the administrative side of his business. He could still clear drains
because “there’s no finesse in it,” but plumbing that required “dex-
terity” was no longer available to him due to loss of feeling in his
fingers. Hence, like Caroline, a particularly difficult but subjectively
important aspect of chronic illness for some people is presenting as
operating still in the timespace of healthy others—particularly for
men, this being a hegemonically gendered space—as a way of man-
aging, hiding, or denying the chronotope disruption of chronic illness.
Discussion
Our purpose in this article was to elaborate chronotope disruption
as a sensitizing concept for understanding chronic illness narratives,
the example being people diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. Our
analysis demonstrated three ways in which chronotope disruption
helped identify, and find a way into understanding, important aspects
of patients’ chronic illness narratives. First, in Medicalized and Em-
bodied Disruptions, we investigated chronotope disruption in terms of
how medical advice can conflict with embodied experience and how
progressive bodily deterioration can provoke a reevaluation of past
illness (self-mis)management. Second, in Tyranny of the (Body)
Clock, we explored chronotope disruption in terms of the increasing
temporal and spatial intrusion of chronic illness into the participants’
lives. Finally, in Performing Normativity, we focused on the mas-
querade of health as an attempt to manage, hide, or deny the chrono-
tope disruption of being physically challenged through chronic illness,
particularly in the presence of others. All are infused by a retrospec-
tive nostalgia for a being-in-the-world that has forever gone. We now
discuss the potential of chronotope disruption to fill an important gap
in the science and to impact the way we approach chronic illness: first
as a concept around which to organize analytical insights, considered
with respect to each of the three strands of our analysis, and second,
more broadly, as a concept around which to develop practice.
Medicalized and Embodied Disruptions
Although chronic illness typically cannot be cured, it can be
managed. This places responsibility on the patient to implement
medical advice, and facilitating adherence is an important aspect of
health psychology research and practice. We have shown how
sensitivity to chronotope disruption reveals the often clashing
timespace, and hence “truths,” of patient and practitioner, provides
insight in why some patients may not engage with (self)-
management. Bakhtin has identified these distinct orientations to
truth as pravda (subjective experience) and istina (objective ab-
stracts): “(p)ravda is not only context specific and unique, but also
embedded in the actual act of a specific person. Istina, to the
contrary, is composed of universal moments” (Sidorkin, 2004, pp.
6, italic in original). From the medical point of view, illness
(self-)management practices are based on objective evidence, and
engaging with them is rational and inherently desirable. In con-
trast, patients oriented to their individual, situated embodiment,
and emotional investments that were not always conducive to
following medical advice.
The contrasting epistemologies of istina and pravda, which is an
important aspect of Bakhtin’s theory of chronotope-as-ideology,
helps reveal tensions in the notion of “control” as a central feature
of chronic illness management that further illuminates patient
resistance. Using diabetes, Broom and Whittaker (2004) show that
“control” has a double meaning. First, control can be used in a
more or less straightforward biochemical sense to denote the level
(position in space) and stability (over time) of glucose in the blood
(istina). Second, it can refer to a patient’s ability to regulate their
own actions: their “self-control” (pravda). In the case of “lifestyle”
illnesses, such as Type 2 diabetes, these two notions of control
can become conflated in an implicit—or feared—moral
(self-)assessment of the patient’s worth (that is, ability to self-
control and, hence, to be a good patient and citizen) through the
measurement of glucose levels. Furthermore, the control denoted
by tests (istina) can usurp the patient’s sense of self-knowing
(pravda) when, as Karas Montez and Karner (2005) suggest,
“some physicians teach their patients that with respect to how they
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feel, the numbers or diagnostic images are more reliable, resulting
in a distrust of subjective feelings” (p. 1095). Indeed, as we
identified in relation to Adrian (Extract 2), Mol (2000) elaborates
how test results from self-monitoring can become for some pa-
tients a specific illness chronotope demarcating their relative well-
being or fragility.
The contrasting epistemologies of istina and pravda are also
relevant to understanding the concept of chronotope disruption as
an important counterbalance to the current, dominant cognitive
paradigm within health psychology (e.g., the theory of planned
behavior: Ajzen, 2011), which has been critiqued as overly rational
(e.g., Dutta-Bergman, 2005). In fact, when psychologists attempt
to measure personality or health cognitions, and tie such constructs
in with health outcomes via the language of probability, they can
be understood as engaging in ontological procedure similar to the
authors of the classical adventure. Here, the hero’s preexisting and
unchanging character (stoical, wise, fearless) determines the out-
come in advance, while time is reduced to an empty series of
relatively independent happenings that the hero merely happens to
pass through (Bakhtin, 1981; see also Holquist, 1990, pp. 109–
110). Such an assumed transcendence of the mind has a long
history with roots stretching at least as far back as early Western
metaphysics (Hope, 2011).
In contrast, emotional register is an inherent feature of Bakhtin’s
theory of chronotope, which forefronts also the pleasures and pains of
the flesh as lived. Moreover, sensitization to the concept of chrono-
tope allows to see the prioritization of the future and, hence, of
prospective time in medical and health sciences concerned with pre-
diction and control. And, as our analysis shows, this can be at odds
with patients’ search for meaning, which, poignantly, tended to
emerge retrospectively in an anguished nostalgia and only once the
link had been experienced viscerally between past (in)action, the
deteriorating body, and the imminent end of the(ir) future. Hence,
there is a strong argument that chronotope as a sensitizing concept is
important in illuminating a blind-spot in current health psychology
identified reflexively through analyzing the timespace mismatch that
can exist between the current, dominant research paradigm and the
patients that health psychologists are seeking to understand.
Tyranny of the (Body) Clock
All our participants talked about the increasing temporal and
spatial intrusion of chronic illness into their lives. In particular, we
considered this in relation to the compromise of improvisational
temporality. The provisionalization of time may be greatest where
the most extensive illness management efforts are required and the
structured temporality of self-management was ubiquitous in our
participants’ narratives. However, paradoxically, the medications
and technologies of self-monitoring that help structure time also
enable patients to improvise in time and a number of participants
spoke about learning to use insulin responsively to their needs, of
transgressing occasionally, or, quite simply, their unproblematic
relationship to the demands of self-management.
Similarily, Balcou-Debussche and Debussche (2009) demon-
strate how bodily transition into a context of provisional time (i.e.,
hospitalization) could be beneficial for self-management practices.
Balcou-Debussche and Debussche conceptualize hospitalization
for people with diabetes as a “suspension of reality,” in which time
and space become highly structured with medical professionals on
hand and diabetes-friendly meals provided. As a rupture in mun-
dane timespace, hospitalization can be considered an exemplary
instance of provisionalized time. However, aspects of this experi-
ence assisted illness control and consequently were valued by
Balcou-Deussche and Debussche’s participants. Hence, we must
avoid assuming that timespace disruption associated with chronic
illness is always burdensome. Indeed, as our analysis demon-
strates, people are often very inventive when it comes to adapting
to change after the onset of illness. The experience of temporal
improvisation may even be heightened for people with chronic
illness insofar as it provides a counterweight to the objectification
of time often involved in self-care (Morris, 2008).
The concept of chronotope does, however, allow us to under-
stand some patient behaviors as creative management of situated
timespace disruption rather than, more negatively, disengagement
with healthcare advice. Moreover, we argue that it has advantages
over extant organizing concepts characterizing illness narratives.
For example, Bury’s (1982) concept of biographical disruption
has been critiqued for overly stressing discontinuity (Williams,
2000), with Pound, Gompertz, and Ebrahim (1998) finding that the
onset of stroke in older working-class people in the East End of
London was perceived to be a continuation of their life struggles.
Chronotope disruption captures at a higher level than biography
the organization of meaning, and does not assume that fundaments
of a life narrative will change with the onset of chronic illness,
while being sensitive to the inherent chronicity (time) and embodi-
ment (space) of long-term illness, however it is storied.
Performing Normativity
Our analysis focused on the masquerade of health as a nostalgic
attempt to manage, hide, or deny the chronotope disruption of
being physically challenged through chronic illness. Disruptions
could be managed, for example, through allowing oneself “treats”
during special social occasions. However, as physical impairments
encroached on activities, they evinced a greater tendency to mask
or deny limits through performing a “normal” body. Puar (2009),
drawing on Butler (1990), suggests how the concept of performa-
tivity may be extended to consider how disable people live in a
society of compulsory able-bodiedness. Furthermore, masquerades
of health can be understood as a protection of “face” (Goffman,
1955), in which one attempts to accomplish a desired social
identity. And our participants’ attempt to avoid social devaluation
was amplified for men who eschewed the way in which chronic
illness could undermine characteristics associated with hegemonic
masculinity (e.g., toughness, invulnerability, independence; Cour-
tenay, 2000).
Chronotope disruption associated with chronic illness can,
therefore, mean being “out of step” and “out of time” with the
social life-world of healthy others. It can also mean being “out of
joint” with oneself, even if “passing” (Butler, 1990) is achieved to
the extent that, like Caroline (Extract 7), one is so immersed in the
“spatiality of situation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2002) that the act
feels real—that is, until the performance becomes too effortful:
“And then it got worse and worse and I thought, ‘Something’s not
right here.’” Hence, becoming chronically ill can mean negotiating
a newly queer identity, betwixed and between, slipping between
categories, and with the potential of being devalued into self-
denial. The concept of chronotope disruption therefore has poten-
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tial also to foster understanding and critique of the lived environ-
ment and the social landscape from a novel concern with affective
timespace, which includes the impact and internalization of the
gaze (Foucault, 1977). In terms of theory, Bakhtin preempted
many aspect of poststructuralism and, hence, allows fruitful con-
nections with contemporary gender and queer theory—as illus-
trated here—and has potential for informing also psychoanalytic
approaches psychosocially conceived.
Implications for Practice
We have examined how the chronotope of people with chronic
illness, our example being Type 2 diabetes, can differ, often pro-
foundly, from that of the able-bodied, the health practitioner, and the
current, dominate research paradigm in health psychology. An im-
portant implication for practice is to consider how to approach and
support people with chronic illness from an understanding of, and
respect for, their perspective and this is a central ethos of patient-
centered care (Kitson, Marshall, Bassett, & Zeitz, 2013). As the
medical profession is coming to realize (e.g., Greenhalgh, 2012),
patient narratives are essential for understanding particularity of need
and everyday health-related practices and provide a complementary
type of knowledge to those aspects of practice that emphasize mea-
surement, standardization, and aggregation. More specifically, insofar
as narratives always signpost some kind of structure of time and space
(Carr, 1986; Murray, 2000), sensitivity to chronotope disruption can
help practitioners couch self-management advice and offer strategies
that takes into account patients’ own temporal and spatial world,
acknowledging creative compromise, and finding common ground
that allow both to move toward each other.
Chronotopes associated with chronic illness, as in all contexts, are
historically embedded. This is not only due to the rapidly changing
and expanding array of usable narrative forms that have proliferated
in our postmodern epoch (Gergen, 1991), but also to the rapid devel-
opment of medical technologies that have implications for health
practice. For example, a new generation of pumps has become avail-
able for people with Type 1diabetes that administer fast-acting insulin
and offer relative freedom from the structured diet and exercise
regimes usually involved in self-management. There is even a possi-
bility that, if combined with a continuous blood glucose monitoring
system, an insulin pump could function as an artificial pancreas
(Jacobs et al., 2011). Such technologies could have profound impli-
cations for temporal-spatial experience in diabetes self-management
and early trials already indicate greater satisfaction and quality of life
(McMahon et al., 2005). However, as Mol’s (2000) analysis of blood
glucose monitoring shows, technology, while potentially providing a
more comfortable life, can bring unintended consequences, for exam-
ple in terms of increased surveillance and control (Foucault, 1977).
Exploring these and similar new healthcare technologies is likely to be
an important area of research for health psychologists, and qualitative
methods elucidating the experience of time and space could help
recognize and suggest strategies to minimize their negative, subjective
impact.
Conclusion
There is no singular and straightforward way in which a given
illness is narrated and self-understood in terms of chronotope. This
depends on contingencies including life context, former relation-
ship with timespace, and the medical and psychosocial resources
available for dealing with disruptions. Qualitative methods are
ideally placed to capture such complexities and to explore how
apparently similar physiological manifestations of illness can be
storied in different ways (Madill & Gough, 2008). Nevertheless,
our analysis did also identify some commonalities between partic-
ipants. Living with chronic illness can be predominantly emotional
and visceral (as opposed to approaches in health sciences that tend
to stress cognition and rationality), can diminish the capacity to
improvise in time as well as pervade the experience of “being in
time” and can change one’s sense of self in further unsettlingly
“queer” ways through being subject to, and internalization of, the
evaluative gaze. These may be especially pronounced in illnesses
such as diabetes that require regular, vigilant monitoring, and often
profound changes in social practices. A program of research could
identify characteristic chronotope disruption associated with dif-
ferent kinds of illness and provide insights into new ways of
promoting healthy practices and providing patient-centered care.
Heterogeneous types of data, such as field-notes or patient’s pho-
tographs and drawings, could be analyzed for chronotopic insight,
and the focus on our material existence in timespace suggests
innovative trans-disciplinary cross-fertilization with research in
geography, architecture, and environmental sciences.
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